AML-ATF Ministerial Advisory 1/2021: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing controls in higher risk jurisdictions

Requirement to apply Enhanced Due Diligence for higher risk jurisdictions

Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform, Hon. Kathy Lynn Simmons, JP, MP today issued AML-ATF Advisory 1/2021 about the risks in a number of jurisdictions arising from inadequate systems and controls to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

The Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008 (POCA Regulations) require the Bermuda regulated sector and relevant persons to apply enhanced customer due diligence to high-risk countries.

  • Regulation 11 (1)(aa) of the Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008, requires that a relevant person must apply on a risk-sensitive basis enhanced customer due diligence measures to business relationships with customers in instances where a person or a transaction is from or in a country that has been identified as having a higher risk by the Financial Action Task Force or the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force; and
  • Regulation 11 (1)(ab) requires a relevant person to apply, on a risk-sensitive basis, enhanced customer due diligence in instances where a person or transaction is from or in a country which represents a higher risk of money laundering, corruption, terrorist financing or being subject to international sanctions. 

As the international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standard-setter, FATF regularly publishes statements that identify high-risk countries based on assessments of their AML/CFT regimes. In accordance with Regulation 11 (1)(aa), the Minister for Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform would like to draw the regulated sector’s and relevant persons’ attention to the latest FATF publication on high risk jurisdictions.

FATF Public Statement 

On 21 February, 2021 FATF published two statements identifying jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes. These statements are included at Annexes A and B.

In response to the latest FATF statements, the Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform advises the regulated sector and relevant persons to consider the following:

Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform Advice:

Consider as a high risk and apply counter measures and enhanced due diligence measures in accordance with the risks 

Take appropriate actions to minimise the associated risks, which may include enhanced due diligence measures in high risk situations

Jurisdictions:

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea* (DPRK)

 

Iran*

Albania
Barbados
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Cayman Islands
Ghana
Jamaica
Mauritius
Morocco
Myanmar*
Nicaragua*
Pakistan
Panama
Senegal
Syria*
Uganda
Yemen*
Zimbabwe*

To ensure that an appropriate determination of the risks relating to these jurisdictions can be carried out, it is important that the annexed statements are read in their entirety.  All financial institutions and relevant persons, in the implementation of their systems and controls to combat financial crime, should give consideration to the FATF assessments and take appropriate actions in light of the associated risks.

*These jurisdictions are subject to sanctions measures at the time of publication of this notice which require firms to take additional measures, in accordance with the International Sanctions Regulations 2013. Details can be found here:

https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/International-Sanctions-Regulations-2013-v2.pdf 

Please see the following links for more information about international sanctions: https://www.gov.bm/international-sanctions-measures and https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-regime-specific-consolidated-lists-and-releases

CFATF Public Statement 

On 11 December, 2020, the CFATF LI Plenary recognised that Sint Maarten has made significant progress in addressing the deficiencies identified in its 2013 Mutual Evaluation Report; therefore, Sint Maarten has exited the 3rd Round Follow-Up Process. The CFATF Public Statement is included at Annex C.

Background Information

  1. This Advisory replaces all previous advisory notices issued by the Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform on this subject.
  2. The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body established by the G7 in 1989 and today its members include 35 member jurisdictions and two regional organisations (the European Commission and the Gulf Co-Operation Council).
  3. The Bermuda Government’s strategy is to use financial tools to deter crime and terrorism; detect it when it happens; and disrupt those responsible and hold them accountable for their actions. The FATF is central to Bermuda’s international objectives within this strategy. 
  4. The Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008 require the regulated sector and relevant persons to put in place policies and procedures in order to prevent activities related to money laundering and terrorist financing. The regulated sector and relevant persons are also required to apply enhanced customer due diligence and enhanced ongoing monitoring on a risk-sensitive basis in certain defined situations and in “any other situation, which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing”.
  5. This Advisory applies to all entities and persons subject to the POCA Regulations as provided for in Regulation 4, namely:
    1. AML/AFT regulated financial institutions;
    2. independent professionals;
    3. casino operators;
    4. dealers in high value goods, who are registered with the FIA; and
    5. real estate brokers and real estate agents.

Therefore, these sectors shall comply with the above AML-ATF Ministerial Advisory.

  1. A large number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF, thus the jurisdictions included in the FATF public statement and ‘ongoing compliance’ document are not intended to provide an exhaustive list of jurisdictions that should be considered by relevant persons to present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Annex A: High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 21 February 2021

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. 

Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for countries in the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action, given that they are already subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures. Therefore, please refer to the statement on these jurisdictions adopted in February 2020. While the statement may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s AML/CFT regimes, the FATF’s call for action on these high-risk jurisdictions remains in effect.

Annex B: Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring  – 25 February 2021

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the ‘grey list’. *

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions noted below and to report on the progress made in addressing the identified strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their agreed action plans expeditiously and within the proposed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence to be applied to these jurisdictions, but encourages its members to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF continues to identify additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF and FSRBs.

Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies

Jurisdictions no longer subject to monitoring

Albania

The Bahamas
Barbados
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Cayman Islands
Ghana
Jamaica
Mauritius
Morocco
Myanmar
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Panama
Senegal
Syria
Uganda
Yemen
Zimbabwe

Trinidad and Tobago 

Albania

In February 2020, Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in July 2018, Albania has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by enhancing relevant authorities’ understanding of terrorist financing risks in order to prosecute TF more effectively and establishing a legal framework to implement targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing. Albania will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) conducting additional in-depth analysis to understand its ML and other risks sufficiently, and enhancing institutional coordination and cooperation; (2) improving the timely handling of mutual legal assistance requests; (3) establishing effective mechanisms to detect and prevent criminal infiltration of the economy, including by strengthening competent authorities’ powers to take necessary action; (4) ensuring that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (5) increasing the number and improving the sophistication of prosecutions and confiscations for ML, especially in cases involving foreign predicate offenses or third-party ML; (6) improving the implementation of targeted financial sanctions, in particular through enhanced supervisory action and targeted, proactive outreach.

The Bahamas 

In October 2018, The Bahamas made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. The FATF has made the initial determination that The Bahamas has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of The Bahamas’ AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Specifically, the Bahamas has made the following key reforms: (1) developing a comprehensive electronic case management system for international cooperation; (2) demonstrating risk-based supervision of non-bank financial institutions; (3) ensuring the timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information; (4) increasing the quality of the FIU’s products to assist LEAs in the pursuance of ML/TF investigations, specifically complex ML/TF and stand-alone ML investigations; (5) demonstrating that authorities are investigating and prosecuting all types of money laundering, including complex ML cases, stand-alone money laundering, and cases involving proceeds of foreign offences; (6) demonstrating that confiscation proceedings are initiated and concluded for all types of ML cases; and (7) addressing gaps in the TF and PF TFS frameworks and demonstrating implementation.

Barbados

In February 2020, Barbados made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in November 2017, Barbados has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by updating the National Risk Assessment and developing mitigating measures. Barbados will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating it effectively applies risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (2) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensure that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (3) increasing the capacity of the FIU to improve the quality of its financial information to further assist LEAs in investigating ML or TF; (4) demonstrating that money laundering investigations and prosecutions are in line with the country’s risk profile and reducing the backlog to complete prosecutions that result in sanctions when appropriate; (5) further pursuing confiscation in ML, including by seeking assistance from foreign counterparts.

Botswana

Since October 2018, when Botswana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Botswana has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by developing its national AML/CFT strategy and operationalising the country’s company registry to maintain beneficial ownership information. Botswana should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) assessing the risks associated with legal persons, legal arrangements, and NPOs; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervisory manuals; (3) improving its analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU; (4) implementing a CFT strategy, and ensuring the TF investigation capacity of the law enforcement agencies; (5) ensuring the implementation without delay of targeted financial sanctions measures related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing, and (6) applying a risk-based approach to monitoring non-profit organisations.

Cambodia

Since February 2019, when Cambodia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Cambodia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating an increase in domestic coordination and cooperation to enhance ML investigations. Cambodia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) providing a broad legal basis for MLA and conducting relevant training to LEAs; (2) implementing risk-based supervision for real estate and casinos; (3) implementing the risk-based supervision to banks, including through prompt, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement actions, as appropriate; (4) amending the AML/CFT Law to address the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (5) enhancing its analysis of STRs and increasing disseminations to LEAs; (6) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (7) demonstrating an increase in the freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value; (8) establishing and implementing a legal framework for UN targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing and enhancing the understanding of sanctions evasion.

Ghana

Since October 2018, when Ghana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Ghana has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by raising awareness of the supervisors and regulated entities to the identified ML/TF risks. Ghana should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing a comprehensive national AML/CFT Policy based on the risks identified in the NRA, including measures to mitigate ML/TF risks associated with the legal persons; (2) improving risk-based supervision, by enhancing the capacity of the regulators and the awareness of the private sector; (3) ensuring the timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information; (4) ensuring that the FIU is focusing its activities on the risks identified in the NRA, and adequately resourced; and (5) applying a risk-based approach for monitoring non-profit organisations.

Iceland

Since October 2019, when Iceland made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Iceland has continued to take significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by increasing the FIU’s human resources to address the volume of STRs and strengthen strategic analysis as well as ensuring effective supervision for targeted financial sanctions compliance and establishing sufficient resources and supervisory procedures to assess TF risks in the NPO sector. Iceland should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by (1) finalising the collection of accurate Beneficial Ownership information and demonstrating the imposition of appropriate sanctions for non-compliance; and (2) concluding work to introduce an automated system for STR filing.

Jamaica

In February 2020, Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in November 2016, Jamaica has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by amending its customer due diligence obligations. Jamaica will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risk; (2) including all FIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and ensuring adequate risk based supervision in all sectors; (3) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensure that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (4) taking proper measures to increase the use of financial information and to increase ML investigations and prosecutions, in line with the country’s risk profile; (5) ensuring the implementation of targeted financial sanctions for terrorist financing without delay; and (6) implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

Mauritius

In February 2020, Mauritius made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2018, Mauritius has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including amending the legal framework to require legal persons and legal arrangements to disclose of beneficial ownership information and improving the processes of identifying and confiscating proceeds of crimes. Mauritius will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating that the supervisors of its global business sector and DNFBPs implement risk-based supervision; (2) ensuring the access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information by competent authorities in a timely manner; (3) demonstrating that LEAs have capacity to conduct money laundering investigations, including parallel financial investigations and complex cases; (4) implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes, and 5) demonstrating the adequate implementation of targeted financial sanctions through outreach and supervision.

Mongolia

Since October 2019, when Mongolia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mongolia continues to take significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating an increase in sanctions and remedial actions by financial supervisors for identified violations, and further seizing and confiscating falsely/non-declared currency. Mongolia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving sectoral ML/TF risk understanding by DNFBP supervisors, applying a risk-based approach to supervision, particularly in relation to dealers in precious metals and stones; (2) demonstrating increased investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML activity in line with identified risks; and (3) monitoring compliance by FIs and DNFBPs with their PF-related TFS obligations, including the application of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Myanmar

In February 2020, Myanmar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in September 2018, Myanmar has proactively made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by introducing various legislative measures and establishing a regulatory framework for the registration of hundi operators. Myanmar will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) ensuring the supervisory body for DNFBPs is sufficiently resourced, onsite/offsite inspections are risk-based, and hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhances in the use of financial intelligence in LEA investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the FIU; (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) demonstrating implementation of TFS related to PF, including training on PF sanctions evasion.

Nicaragua

In February 2020, Nicaragua made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in July 2017, Nicaragua has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by increasing the use of financial information in the investigation and prosecution of ML offenses and fixing its legal framework for criminalizing TF. Nicaragua will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risk; (2) more proactively seeking international cooperation to support ML investigation, especially with the aim of identifying and tracing assets with confiscation and repatriation purposes; (3) conducting effective risk based supervision; (4) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensure that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis.

Pakistan

Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan’s political commitment has led to progress in a number of areas in its action plan, including risk-based supervision and pursuing domestic and international cooperation to identify cash couriers. Pakistan should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that remedial actions and sanctions are applied in cases of AML/CFT violations, relating to TF risk management and TFS obligations; (2) demonstrating that competent authorities are cooperating and taking action to identify and take enforcement action against illegal money or value transfer services (MVTS); (3) demonstrating the implementation of cross-border currency and BNI controls at all ports of entry, including applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; (4) demonstrating that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are identifying and investigating the widest range of TF activity and that TF investigations and prosecutions target designated persons and entities, and those acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated persons or entities; (5) demonstrating that TF prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (6) demonstrating effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions (supported by a comprehensive legal obligation) against all 1267 and 1373 designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf, including preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets (movable and immovable), and prohibiting access to funds and financial services; (7) demonstrating enforcement against TFS violations including administrative and criminal penalties and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases; (8) demonstrating that facilities and services owned or controlled by designated person are deprived of their resources and the usage of the resources.

All deadlines in the action plan have expired. While noting recent and notable improvements, the FATF again expresses concerns given Pakistan’s failure to complete its action plan in line with the agreed timelines and in light of the TF risks emanating from the jurisdiction. To date, Pakistan has largely addressed 14 of 27 action items, with varying levels of progress made on the rest of the action plan. The FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by June 2020. Otherwise, should significant and sustainable progress especially in prosecuting and penalising TF not be made by the next Plenary, the FATF will take action, which could include the FATF calling on its members and urging all jurisdiction to advise their FIs to give special attention to business relations and transactions with Pakistan.

Panama

Since June 2019, when Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Panama has taken some steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by drafting sectoral risk assessments for the corporate and DNFBP sectors and free trade zones. Panama should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening its understanding of the national and sectoral ML/TF risk and informing findings to its national policies to mitigated the identified risks; (2) proactively taking action to identify unlicensed money remitters, applying a risk-based approach to supervision of the DNFBP sector and ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions again AML/CFT violations; (3) ensuring adequate verification and update of beneficial ownership information by obliged entities, establishing an effective mechanisms to monitor the activities of offshore entities, assessing the existing risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shareholders and directors, and ensuring timely access to adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information; and (4) ensuring effective use of FIU products for ML investigations, demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes and to provide constructive and timely international cooperation with such offence, and continuing to focus on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas identified in the NRA and MER.

Syria

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Uganda

In February 2020, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2016, Uganda has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including conducting its first national ML/TF risk assessment and amending the relevant legal frameworks to addressed the technical deficiencies in its ML and TF offences. Uganda will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) adopting a national AML/CFT strategy; (2) seeking international cooperation in line with the country’s risk profile; (3) developing and implementing risk-based supervision to FIs and DNFBPs; (4) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information for legal entities; (5) demonstrating LEAs and judicial authorities apply the ML offence consistent with the identified risks; (6) establishing and implementing policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (7) demonstrating that LEAs conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions commensurate with Uganda’s TF risk profile; (8) addressing the technical deficiencies in the legal framework to implement PF-related TFS and implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

Yemen

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Zimbabwe

Since October 2019, when Zimbabwe made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Zimbabwe has taken initial steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing a legal framework to collect beneficial ownership information of legal person and arrangements. Zimbabwe should continue to work on implementing its action plan, including by: (1) improving understanding of the key ML/TF risks among the relevant stakeholders and implementing the national AML/CFT policy base on the identified risks; (2) implementing risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs including through capacity building among the supervisory authority; (3) ensuring development of adequate risk mitigation measures among FIs and DNFBPs, including by applying proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to breaches; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework and mechanism to collect and maintain accurate and updated beneficial ownership information for legal persons and arrangements, and ensure timey assess by the competent authorities; and (5) addressing remaining gaps in the TF and PF-related TFS frameworks and demonstrating implementation.

Jurisdictions No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

 

Trinidad and Tobago

The FATF welcomes Trinidad and Tobago’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Trinidad and Tobago has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in November 2017. Trinidad and Tobago is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. Trinidad and Tobago will continue to work with CFATF to improve further its AML/CFT regime.

 * This statement was previously called "Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process"Annex C: CFATF Public Statement – 11 December 2020

The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) is an organisation of twenty-five jurisdictions of the Caribbean Basin Region, which have agreed to implement the International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (The FATF Recommendations). In order to protect the international financial system from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the CFATF identifies jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.

 

Jurisdiction exiting the Third Round of Mutual Evaluations

 

 

Sint Maarten 

 

The CFATF LI Plenary recognised that Sint Maarten has made significant progress in addressing the deficiencies identified in its 2013 Mutual Evaluation Report; therefore, Sint Maarten has exited the 3rd Round Follow-Up Process. 

 

Sint Maarten’s 12th Follow-Up Report, which was presented at the November-December 2020 Virtual Plenary contains a detailed description and analysis of the actions taken by Sint Maarten to rectify the deficiencies identified in respect of the Core and Key Recommendations rated PC or NC, as was well as a summary of progress in other recommendations that received low ratings in the 2013 Mutual Evaluation Report. 

 

The CFATF encourages Sint Maarten to continue its progress towards strengthening its AML/CFT framework and ensuring that it is fully prepared for the 4th Round of Mutual Evaluations.